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Conflict of Laws: Full Faith and Credit and Collateral Attack
on the Determination of Jurisdiction: The petitioners instituted a
quiet title action concerning bottom land on the Missouri River where
it forms the boundary between Missouri and Nebraska. "The Ne-
braska court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the controversy
only if the land in question was in Nebraska."' Both parties to the action
appeared in the Nebraska court and fully litigated the issues. After a
hearing, the Nebraska court ruled in favor of the petitioners and quieted
title in them. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Nebraska affirmed the
judgment after a trial de novo on the record made in the lower court.
In the hearing, the Nebraska Supreme Court specifically found that the
land in question was located in Nebraska and, therefore, that the Ne-
braska courts had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.2
Rather than petitioning the United Stateg Supreme Court for a writ
of certiorari, the respondent, the losing party in the Nebraska courts,
commenced the identical quiet title action in Missouri. The case was
removed to the federal district court in Missouri on the basis of diver-
sity of citizenship. The district court ruled that the judgment of the
Nebraska Supreme Court was res judicata and, therefore, the subject
matter was not open to further litigation. 3 The case was then taken to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which re-
versed the district court.4 Granting certiorari, the United States Su-
preme Court in Durfee v. Duke' reversed the decision of the court of
appeals, thereby supporting the decisio of the Nebraska Supreme Court.
The United States Supreme Court held that
. . . the Federal Court in Missouri had the power, and upon
proper averments the duty, to inquire into the jurisdiction of the
Nebraska courts to render the decree quieting title to the land
in the petitioners. We further hold that when that inquiry dis-
closed, as it did, that the jurisdictional issues had been fully and
fairly litigated by the parties and finally determined in the Ne-
braska courts, the Federal Court in Missouri was correct in
ruling that further inquiry was precluded.6
Stated simply, the Supreme Court will not sanction legal procedures
which permit collateral attack on the jurisdiction of a court, if the issue
of jurisdiction had been fully litigated before that court according to
I Durfee v. Duke, 84 S. Ct. 242, 243 (1963).
2 Durfee v. Keiffer, 168 Neb. 272, 95 N.W. 2d 618 (1959).
3 Duke v. Durfee, 215 F. Supp. 901 (W.D. Mo. 1961).
4 Duke v. Durfee, 308 F. 2d 209 (8th Cir. 1962). The decision of this court has
been criticized. 63 COLUmn. L. REv. 353 (1963) ; 51 GEo. L. J. 851 (1963) ; 111
U. PA. L. Rxv. 1218 (1963); 37 TuL. L. REv. 335 (1963) ; 49 VA. L. REv. 180
(1963).
'84 S. Ct. 242 (1963).
6Id. at 248.
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the requirements of due process.7 Although the Supreme Court has
previously allowed one state to relitigate the jurisdictional finding of
another state where there appears to have been no actual contest," the
practical need to end litigation concerning the jurisdiction has led the
Supreme Court to apply the principles of res judicata to a determination
of jurisdiction by a state court?
The rule against collateral attack on the jurisdiction of a court is a
mandate of the United States Constitution." This constitutional pro-
vision and the federal statute implementing it prevent a disappointed
party from proceeding to another jurisdiction for a more favorable
adjudication of his claim. The command of the full faith and credit
clause is simply "that the same faith and credit be elsewhere given to a
judgment of the courts of any State as would be received by it in the
courts of that State."" Thus, in Durfee, once the federal district court
in Missouri decided that the Nebraska court had fully litigated the jur-
isdictional question, it correctly held that the decision of the Nebraska
court was binding upon it. The basic principle is that "the full faith and
credit clause of the Constitution precludes any inquiry into the merits
of the cause of action, the logic or consistency of the decision, or the
validity of the legal principle on which the judgment is based."' 2
The question arises as to precisely what the court of a sister state
may do upon receiving a case after the same cause has already been
decided in another jurisdiction. In an early Supreme Court decision,
the Court held that "the jurisdiction of the court by which the judgment
is rendered in any state may be questioned in a collateral proceeding in
7 Accord, Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948); Trienies v. Sunshine Min-
ing Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939); Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165 (1938) (subject
matter jurisdiction) ; Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283
U.S. 522 (1931) (personal jurisdiction).8 Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. 457 (1873).
9 Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343, 349 (1942).
10 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each state
to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.
And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which
such Acts, Records, and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof."
Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1948).
"United States v. Robinson, 74 F. Supp. 427, 430 (W.D. Ark. 1947) ; Roche v.
McDonald, 275 U.S. 449, 451 (1927).
12Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462 (1940) ; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICr OF LAWS§ 451(2) (Supp. 1948); accord, RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 10 (1942):
"Where a court has jurisdiction over the parties and determines that it hasjurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties cannot collaterally attack
the judgment on the ground that the court did not have jurisdiction over
subject matter, unless the policy underlying the doctrine of res judicata is
outweighed by the policy against permitting the court to act beyond itsjurisdiction. Among the factors appropriate to be considered in determining
that collateral attack should be permitted are that (a) the lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter was clear; (b) the determination as to jurisdiction
depended upon a question of law rather than of fact; (c) the court was
one of limited and not of general jurisdiction; (d) the question of jurisdiction




another state, notwithstanding the provision of the fourth article of the
Constitution. '13 Subsequently, this general statement has been modified
by the United States Supreme Court in Durfee and similar cases in-
volving the jurisdiction of a lower court. In Stoll v. Gottlieb,'4 the
Illinois Supreme Court refused to recognize a plea of res judicata
arising from orders of a district court in bankruptcy. Accordingly, the
United States Supreme Court could see
• . . no reason why a court, in the absence of an allegation of
fraud in obtaining the judgment, should examine again the ques-
tion whether the actual contest over jurisdiction between the
parties, did have jurisdiction of the subject matter of the litiga-
tion.
Courts to determine the rights of parties are an integral part
of our system of government. It is just as important that there
should be a place to begin litigation. After a party has his day
in court, with opportunity to present his evidence and his view
of the law, a collateral attack upon the decision as to jurisdiction
there rendered merely retries the issue previously determined.
There is no reason to expect that the second decision will be more
satisfactory than the first. 5
In Sherrer v. Sherrer,0 the Court stated that once a defendant in
a divorce proceeding "has been accorded full opportunity to contest the
jurisdictional issues, and where the decree is not susceptible to such
collateral attack in the courts of the State which rendered the decree," 17
defendant is barred from further attacking the question of jurisdiction,
because full faith and credit must be given to courts having proper
jurisdiction. In the Durfee decision, the Supreme Court summed up
these prior holdings, stating that "since the question of subject matter
jurisdiction had been fully litigated in the original forum, the issue
could not be retried in a subsequent action between the parties."' s In
effect, the Supreme Court is making the local doctrine of res judicata
a part of our national jurisprudence. 9
Upon receiving an adverse ruling in Nebraska, the only procedural
step would have been for the defendant (respondent in the United
States Supreme Court) to petition the Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari,2 0 rather than commencing the action de novo in Missouri. If
there was error in the Nebraska proceedings, the right to review the
error was in the Nebraska or the federal appellate courts. The method
provided for all litigants seeking final determination of their claims is
13 Thompson v. Whitman, supra note 8, at 469.
'4 305 U.S. 165 (1938).is Id. at 172.
16 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
17 Id. at 351-52.
18 Note 5 supra, at 246.
19 Riley v. New York Trust Co., supra note 9, at 349.
20 See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3) (1958).
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to appeal to higher appellate courts.2 It is clear that neither party would
have been satisfied if respondent's method of litigation resulted in two
federal district courts handing down contrary decisions, one holding for
the petitioner and the other favoring respondent. The practical rationale
is that
... public policy requires that there be an end to litigation; so
where one voluntarily appears and without success contestsjurisdiction, the Supreme Court has held that he is "concluded
by the judgment of the tribunal to which he has submitted his
case." He cannot attack collaterally. However, he can appealfrom the original judgment and, if necessary, to the Supreme
Court of the United States.2 2 (Emphasis added.)
It appears that the losing party waives the issue of jurisdiction in the
original suit if he does not appeal the adverse ruling through the cus-
tomary appellate channels 2 3
Although the issue of jurisdiction, as decided by the Nebraska
court, was held to be final and binding in the federal district court in
Missouri, there is strong evidence that the land in question was actually
in Missouri. Even though the district court adhered to the constitu-
tional principle of full faith and credit, the court in dicta stated:
[I]t is difficult for me to understand how, under all the evi-
dence, that the land in controversy is, or was at the time the
issue was determined by that court, in Nebraska .... [I]t is my
belief that the evidence clearly reveals that the land lies in
Missouri .... 14 (Emphasis added.)
The reason for this peculiar situation is explained by the "bootstrap
doctrine."2 5 The theory underlying this doctrine is "that a court which
initially has no jurisdiction can lift itself into jurisdiction, when the
issue is litigated, by its own incorrect but conclusive finding that it does
have jurisdiction."'2 The application of this doctrine contravenes the
principle "that no state can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority
over persons or property without its territory."2 7 The courts, however,
are inclined to overlook the latter and apply the former. In Stoll v.
Gottlieb2 s the court said:
A court does not have the power, by judicial fiat, to extend itsjurisdiction over matters beyond the scope of the authority
granted to it by its creators. There must be admitted, however,
a power to interpret the language of the jurisdictional instrument
and its application to an issue before the court. Where adversary
21 Trienies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66, 77 (1939).
22 STRUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWs 113 (3d ed. 1963).
23 Stimson, When Does a Court Have Jurisdiction, 45 A.B.A.J. 569, 636 (1959).
24 Note 3 supra, at 907, 909.
22 Note, 53 HARV. L. REv. 652 (1940).
26 LEFLAR, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 74, at 143 (1st ed. 1959).
27 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1871).
28 Note 14 supra.
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parties appear, a court must have the power to determine whether
or not it has jurisdiction of the person of a litigant, or whether
its geographical jurisdiction covers the place of the occurrence
under consideration. . . . An erroneous affirmative conclusion
as to the jurisdiction does not in any proper sense enlarge the
jurisdiction of the court until passed upon by the court of last
resort, and even then the jurisdiction becomes enlarged only
from the necessity of having a judicial determination of the juris-
diction over the subject matter. When an erroneous judgment,
whether from a court of first instance or from the court of final
resort, is pleaded in another court or other jurisdiction the ques-
tion is whether the former judgment is res judicata.29 (Emphasis
added.)
Whether or not there ever was de facto jurisdiction is not the issue
once the case is appealed to the federal courts. The situation is the same
when the case is taken to the United States Supreme Court upon certi-
orari, or when the possibility of appeal has been foreclosed by the pas-
sage of time or by denial of certiorari. When the litigation reaches this
point, the issue before the court of last resort is to decide whether the
original judgment is entitled to full faith and credit.
It is important to note that the Supreme Court in the Durfee case
did not conclusively determine the boundary between Nebraska and
Missouri. This is emphasized in the Supreme Court's concurring opin-
ion:
[W]e are not deciding the question whether the respondent
would continue to be bound by the Nebraska judgment should
it later be authoritatively decided, either in an original proceeding
between the States in this Court or by a compact between the two
states under Art. I, §10, that the disputed tract is in Missouri. 30
Thus, since the finality achieved by the litigation only applies to the
parties in the action and their privies,31 future litigation originating in
Missouri may create several practical problems if the land is then de-
termined to be in Missouri.3 2 There would be no bar to the state of
Missouri bringing a property tax suit against the petitioners, the land-
owners as declared by the Nebraska court. Since the parties to this
hypothetical tax dispute are original, the issue of jurisdiction as deter-
mined by the Nebraska court in Durfee may only have the authority
of stare decisis. The fact that strong evidence exists that the Nebraska
court did "lift" the tract of land in dispute into its jurisdiction renders
it probable that the Missouri court would declare the land to be within
the Missouri boundaries and subject to a Missouri property tax. At
291 d. at 171-72.
30 Note 5 supra, at 248.
31 Iselin v. C. W. Hunter Co., 173 F. 2d 388 (5th Cir. 1949) ; Martin v. Lopes,
28 Cal. 2d 618, 170 P. 2d 881, 883 (1946).
32 Ordinarily, the law applied to property is determined by the situs of that
property. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 208, 211, 214, 215
(Tent. Draft No. 5, 1959).
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the same time, petitioners' land migkt well be burdened with a Nebraska
property tax, because the Nebraska court held the land to be part of its
state. In conjunction with the property tax problem, a similar question
will arise in determining which state may levy an inheritance tax if the
land passes through intestacy or probate. Missouri may decide to impose
an inheritance tax on the land and cause the issue of jurisdiction to be
relitigated.
In addition, although the Nebraska court in Durfee awarded the
land to petitioners, it could be questioned whether petitioners received
a marketable title. When giving a sample definition of marketable title,
a Wisconsin court stated that
• * . although a title is good, if there is reasonable doubt as to
its validity it is not marketable. A material defect is such as will
cause a reasonable doubt and just apprehension in the mind of
a reasonably prudent and intelligent person, acting upon com-
petent legal advice, and prompt him to refuse to accept it. If such
doubt exists as to make the title subject to probable attack by
legal proceedings, or depends upon facts which can only be es-
tablished by parol evidence if attack is made upon it in such pro-
ceeding, the title is not marketable.33
According to this definition of marketable title, it does not appear that
the present landowner has the assurance of freedom from successful
litigation. It is open to question whether an attorney would advise his
client to purchase land which may be subject to the laws of a different
state or to the laws of two states. It may also be true that other parties
exist who have an interest in the disputed land and a right to begin suit
in the Missouri courts. These "new parties" may seek better treatment
under more favorable Missouri law. Hence, it would be advantageous
for them to retry the issue of the jurisdiction of the Nebraska court
over the land in dispute.
In Durfee v. Duke, the Supreme Court of the United States de-
cided the Nebraska court's jurisdiction of land lying on the Nebraska-
Missouri boundary according to the mandates of full faith and credit
and according to prior Supreme Court decisions. However, the Court
left open the substantive question as to whether the land was in Ne-
braska or Missouri. In subsequent litigation with parties not in privity
to those in the original action, or with parties having different claims
than those already litigated, the Missouri court may be called on to
retry the issue of jurisdiction over the land. In essence, the Supreme
Court did not finally decide that the land is located within the boun-
daries of Nebraska, and petitioners may have won only a Pyrrhic
victory. JAMES Wm. DWYER
33 Douglass v. Ransom, 205 Wis. 439, 446, 237 N.W. 260, 263 (1931).
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